We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of internal&external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination. JEL-Classsification: C68, C72, H41, Q25
Introduction
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001) the enhanced greenhouse effect, caused by anthropogenic emissions of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs) like carbon dioxide and methane, will negatively affect living conditions of current and future generations in almost all regions of the world. The enhanced greenhouse effect is a typical example of a global common problem. In every country, a multitude of fossil fuel users (cars, lorries, households, industries and farmers) emit GHGs that dissipate into the atmosphere where they mix uniformly. Since the global atmosphere is an open-access depository of GHGs, individual polluters have no incentive to internalize their climate change externalities.
As it is well-known, this non-cooperative situation is not optimal from the global society´s point of view (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Endres 1997 , Tahvonen 1994 and Eyckmans et al. 1993 ). In order to reach a globally optimal solution, some kind of international coordination of climate policies is needed. However, economists are skeptical about the prospects of effective international policy coordination due to free-rider incentives and the lack of a supranational enforcement power.
The bulk of the environmental economics literature has been using non-cooperative game theory 1 to explain the problems of forming coalitions by applying the concept of internal and external stability (I&E-S; e.g., Barrett 1994 , Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 , Hoel 1992 and Rubio and Ulph 2001 . It is assumed that countries forming an international environmental agreement (IEA), i.e., a non-trivial coalition 2 , coordinate their policies by jointly maximizing the aggregate welfare to their coalition. An IEA is said to be internally stable if none of its members wants to leave; it is externally stable if none of the outsiders wants to join it. A key result of this literature, which has been called a paradox by Barrett (1994) , is that whenever cooperation (global optimum) would generate large global welfare gains compared to a noncooperative situation (Nash equilibrium), stable coalitions achieve only little. Moreover, it is pointed out that from participation one cannot conclude success of cooperation: small coalitions may achieve more than large coalitions in terms of global welfare and emission reduction.
3 1 For a discussion about the differences between non-cooperative and cooperative game theory see Bloch (1997) , Finus (2003a) and Finus and Rundshagen (2003b) . For cooperative game theory approaches to IEAs see for instance Tulkens (1995) and , Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999) and Funaki and Yamato (1999) .
2
A non-trivial coalition is a coalition of at least two members.
3
For an overview of assumptions and results of game theoretical analyses of IEAs see Finus (2001 and 2003a ).
I&E-S makes at least two implicitly assumptions that have been questioned by Carraro (1997) for the first time in the context of IEAs. First, I&E-S restricts coalition formation to only one (non-trivial) coalition. That is, countries have only the option to join an agreement or to remain a non-signatory (singleton) but cannot group into different agreements. Clearly from a theoretical point of view, such a restriction is not satisfactory. The key questions are whether countries will form "regional agreements" instead of one "global agreement" if this assumption is given up and if so whether "multiple agreements" are superior to a "single agreement"
in welfare or ecological terms. 4 From the theoretically oriented literature (e.g., Carraro 2000 , Carraro and Marchiori 2003 , Finus 2001 and Finus and Rundshagen 2003a it appears that, indeed, in equilibrium multiple coalitions will emerge. However, those results have been derived under the assumption of symmetric (identical) players and welfare and ecological conclusions can only be derived for even more restrictive assumptions. Thus, it is the first objective of this paper to analyze the effect of single versus multiple coalition formation under more realistic assumptions, using data from an integrated assessment model of climate change.
5
However, this issue has also an empirical dimension that may seem more controversial. On the one hand, one may argue that all IEAs that have been signed up to now are single agreements. There is only one Montreal Protocol that regulates CFCs (chloro-fluoro-carbons), one
Oslo Protocol that aims at reducing sulfur emissions and only one Kyoto Protocol with the objective to mitigate global warming. On the other hand, at least for more recent protocols, it is evident that members are treated differently and that therefore these protocols may be interpreted as multiple coalitions agreements. 6 For instance, the Kyoto Protocol distinguishes between Annex-B-and non-Annex B-countries where only the former group has agreed to quantified emission ceilings. Another example is the Montreal Protocol that makes special 4 "Regional or multiple agreements" means a coalition structure with multiple non-trivial coalitions and a "global or single agreement" is a coalition structure with only one non-trivial coalition where a coalition structure is a partition of N players. For details see section 2.
5 Integrated assessment models of climate change combine a stylized version of the world economy with a synthetic model of the global carbon cycle and climate and contain a full feedback of the physical environment on the economy. The seminal models in the field of climate change are DICE by Nordhaus (1993) and RICE by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) . 6 This is different for "old IEAs" that typically require a uniform emission reduction by all participants. Examples include the Helsinki Protocol in 1985 on sulfur emission reduction (uniform reduction of 30% compared to 1980 emissions), the Sofia Protocol in 1988 on nitrogen oxides emission reduction (uniform requirement to freeze emissions at 1987 levels) and the Geneva Protocol in 1991 on the reduction of volatile organic compounds (uniform reduction of 30% compared to 1988 emission levels).
provisions for developing countries, allowing for a longer transition period for compliance with abatement targets, exempting them from certain regulations and providing the option to draw on funds that are financed by developed countries.
Intuitively, we expect that allowing for the possibility to form multiple coalitions will increase the success of international pollution control. Regional agreements allow for more flexibility in coordinating different interests. Countries with similar interests will gather in a coalition.
Hence, the free-riding problem will be less pronounced because of "homogenous coalitions".
Some countries that would not join the global agreement because they find abatement efforts too ambitious might form a regional agreement with like-minded countries, implementing at least moderate abatement targets. Thus if no large single agreement is stable, small regional agreements may be a pragmatic second best solution.
The second assumption of I&E-S is that of open membership, which follows from the definition of external stability. That is, countries can join an agreement without the consent of existing members. Hence, it is easy for outsiders to upset a potentially stable coalition, i.e., a coalition that is internally stable. Consequently from a theoretical point of view, it is evident that some form of exclusive membership may help to stabilize IEAs (e.g., Marchiori 2003 and Rundshagen 2003a,c Secondly, as mentioned above, our paper is inspired by recent developments in non-cooperative game theory that question fundamental assumptions of the traditional stability analysis of IEAs (e.g., Carraro 1997 and 2000) . In contrast to this literature that has assumed symmetric countries, we analyze those issues based on a data set derived from an integrated assessment climate model. Thirdly, our paper is in the tradition of the literature that empirically tests stability of climate coalitions (e.g., Bosello et al. 2001 , Botteon and Carraro 1997 , Buchner et al. 2002 and Tol 2001 . In contrast to the bulk of this literature, we pay more attention to the game theoretic underpinning of our model, consider modification of standard stability concepts and use an integrated assessment climate model that captures all important dynamic aspects of the greenhouse gas problem.
In the following, we lay out the game theoretical setting in section 2 and describe the empirical module of our model in section 3. Stable coalition structures are reported and evaluated in section 4. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and concludes with some final remarks.
The Game Theoretic Background of Coalition Formation

The Two-Stage Game
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage players (i.e., countries or regions) decide on their membership in a coalition, in the second stage coalition members choose their economic strategies.
First Stage
The decision in the first stage is modeled as a coalition game. Its definition comprises three elements: 1) the set of players I={1, ..., N} with a particular player denoted by index i or j,
2) the set of coalition (or, alternatively, announcement) strategies
particular strategy of player denoted by i∈ I i i σ ∈ Σ , and 3) a coalition function that maps membership strategies σ = into coalition structures,
is a partition of players where a particular coalition is denoted by c , ,
and c C ∈ where C is the set of all possible coalition structures.
We consider two coalition games in the spirit of Yi and Shin´s (1995) open membership game that we call single and multiple coalition game. The single coalition game captures the notion that players can only choose between strategy i 0 σ = that means "I do not want to sign the agreement" and that means "I want to sign the agreement". More formally, we have: 
In order to capture the possibility that players can form multiple or regional agreements, we have to increase the number of coalition strategies. Since the maximum number of coalitions is N (all players form a singleton coalition), the strategy set must comprise now N instead of only two strategies. In terms of the coalition function we have to ensure that those players that have made the same announcement will form one coalition. Thus, we have: 
From Definition 1 and 2 it is evident that the outcome of the coalition game will be a coalition structure of the form c . In the case of the MCG, coalitions c may be non-trivial coalitions whereas in the SCG they are always singletons. If M=N (each player is in a singleton coalition), this corresponds to the singleton coalition structure and if M=1 (all players are in one coalition), this is called the grand coalition. − . The exact relationship between economic strategies (e.g., emission abatement and capital investment) and welfare as well as the elements in players´ welfare function will be outlined in section 3. For the valuation functionmapping coalition structures into payoffs -we make the following standard assumptions (Bloch 1997 and Yi 1997 implies an equilibrium economic strategy vector corresponding to the "classical" Nash equilibrium (social optimum). Thus, the highest global welfare will be obtained in the grand coalition, and any welfare level below that in any other coalition structure. Hence, inefficiencies in policy coordination must solely stem from the fact that countries do no form the grand coa- Definition 3 implicitly assumes no transfers. This is one option that we consider in our simulations below, which we call the "no transfer case". Alternatively, we consider a second option to which we refer to as the "transfer case". Of course, there are many possibilities how the gains of cooperation could be distributed among coalition members as for instance the Shapley value (Barrett 1997, Botteon and Carraro 1997) or the Chander/Tulkens´ transfer scheme (Chander and Tulkens 1997) . We restrict ourselves to a modified version of the last transfer scheme of which the details will be laid out in section 3. At this stage, it suffices to point out that this transfer scheme assumes a particular rule how the surplus from cooperation within a coalition is distributed. Hence, c) t + where implies that a player receives a transfer and that a player pays a transfer.
Stability in the Reduced Stage Game
For the properties of the welfare function that we define in section 3 it turns out that s is unique and lies well within the boundaries of the economic strategy space. Thus, there is a unique valuation (vector of individual payoffs) that is associated with each coalition structure . Consequently, the entire coalition formation process can be reduced to one single stage. This reduced stage game looks as follows: each player chooses his/her coalition strategy, , either according to Definition 1 (SCG) or Definition 2 (MCG), the strategy vector
σ N is mapped into coalition structure c, leading to valuation .
Hence, we can define stable coalition structures in terms of There are many ways to define stability in the context of single and multiple coalitions, capturing the notions of open and exclusive membership. We chose definitions that are inspired by Carraro (1997 and 2000) which are closely related to the concept of internal&external stability in order to stress similarities and differences. Moreover, we chose a compact definition to highlight differences in terms of membership rules. We start by defining stability in the single coalition game.
Single Coalition Game
Regardless which membership rule we consider, it is evident that no signatory should have an incentive to leave the agreement. This corresponds to the notion of internal stability. Moreover, an equilibrium coalition structure should also not be upset by a non-signatory joining the agreement. Under open membership, this requires that no non-signatory has an incentive to join the agreement. This is the classical definition of external stability that we call external stability condition 1 in Definition 4 below. Of course, if no non-signatory has an incentive to join the agreement, then an agreement is also stable under exclusive membership. In other words, there is no need to vote on accession since no outsider will submit an application for joining the agreement anyway. However, suppose a non-signatory has an incentive to join, then under exclusive membership the members of the agreement have to decide whether to accept a new member (external stability condition 2 in Definition 4 below). Due to the assumption of complete information, all members can evaluate whether they would benefit from the enlarged coalition. Under majority voting, accession will be accepted if a (strict) majority is in favor of the application (external stability condition 2.1) and under unanimity voting only if all members are in favor (external stability condition 2.2). In other words, a coalition structure that is not externally stable under open membership may be stable under exclusive membership if a (weak) majority (majority voting) or at least one member (unanimity voting) is against accession. More formally, we have: 
c) external stability 2: 
Multiple Coalition Game
In a multiple coalition structure, any member of a non-trivial coalition can leave its coalition to become a singleton by announcing an address that has not been announced before. Hence, internal stability is, again, a necessary condition for stability under all membership rules.
Moreover, singletons can join a coalition by announcing the same address as coalition members of some coalition c I . However, singletons may also join another singleton. By the same token, members of a non-trivial coalition may join another non-trivial coalition or a singleton.
Thus, in the context of multiple coalitions the meaning of external stability is less obvious than in the single coalition game. Hence, we introduce a term called intracoalitional stability.
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Under open membership, a coalition structure is intracoalitional stable if no player, regardless whether he/she is a singleton or belongs to a non-trivial coalition, has an incentive to join another coalition, regardless whether this is a trivial or non-trivial coalition (intracoalitional stability condition 1). However, in order to capture the notion of voluntary participation in an agreement, it seems necessary to make sure that if a player has an incentive to join a singleton player, this player has to agree to accession (intracoalitional stability condition 2). This ensures that singletons cannot be forced into cooperation and is captured by intracoalitional stability condition 2 in Definition 5 below.
8
Of course, if either no player has an incentive to change membership or if a player wants to join a singleton but this suggestion is turned down by the singleton, this coalition structure is also stable under exclusive membership. However, under exclusive membership, we also have to consider the possibility that a player, currently being a singleton or belonging to some nontrivial coalition, wants to join (or switch to) another non-trivial coalition, which may be turned down by majority voting (intracoalitional stability condition 3.1) or by unanimity (intracoalitional stability condition 3.2). More formally, we have: membership under majority and unanimity voting, respectively, and C denotes the set of equilibria. As pointed out above, we expect that some equilibrium coalition structures comprise multiple non-trivial coalitions due to a higher flexibility of finding "suitable partners".
However, it is also evident from the discussion that the amount of possible deviations in the multiple coalition context is substantially higher than in the single coalition context, making it easier to upset a potential equilibrium coalition structure. For instance, suppose that coalition structure c*=({1,2},{3},{4},{5},{6}) is internally and externally stable under open membership in the single coalition game. Now suppose that player 3 has an incentive to join player 4 and vice versa. Then, c* is not stable anymore in the multiple coalition game (and c*´=({1,2},{3,4},{5},{6}) may not be stable either). Thus, it will be interesting to observe in section 4, which of the two opposed effects is stronger and what this implies for the success of coalition formation.
The Empirical Background of Coalition Formation
The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model
The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (henceforth abbreviated CWSM) is an integrated assessment, economy-climate model that resembles closely the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) . We give here only a short and informal overview of CWSM, a more detailed description can be found in Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999 
Gross production can be interpreted as "potential GDP 
of other countries. This gives rise to two first order conditions of country i being a member of coalition in coalition structure c at time t (see Appendix for details). Given the public "bad" nature of emissions, the economic strategies of countries are interdependent. Therefore, we must simultaneously solve the two first order conditions for each country at each time t for every coalition structure c. Since we assume complete information, the equilibrium strategy vectors can be interpreted as open loop Nash equilibria.
In order to compute the valuation function numerically, we use a standard iterative algorithm.
We never encountered convergence problems and found always a unique equilibrium for each of the 203 possible coalition structures.
As pointed out in section 2, in the case of no transfers valuations follow immediately from equilibrium economic strategies. In the case of transfers, we derive a "corrected valuation" . We adopt the transfer scheme used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999) , which is a modification of the scheme proposed by Tulkens (1995 and . The scheme assumes only transfers within coalitions where the surplus of a coalition from cooperation is allocated according to a proportional sharing rule:
where shares λ are given by:
and denotes the valuation in some coalition c and the valuation in the singleton coalition structure. The first term in big brackets in (3) sets every country back to its welfare level in the singleton coalition structure, the second term allocates the total surplus of coalition compared to the singleton coalition structure in proportion to their marginal damages.
Hence, the second term in (3) favors countries with relatively high potential production and/or marginal damage estimates and low discount rates since they are entitled to a larger share of their coalition´s aggregate payoff. However, the first term ensures that members, which would lose from cooperation without transfers because they contribute much to joint abatement but benefit only little because of low marginal abatement and damage costs, break at least even provided there is a surplus from cooperation. That this may not generally be the case is evident by noting the following relations. Suppose we start either from the singleton coalition structure c N or some other coalition structure c and that some countries or coalitions merge leading to coalition structure c´. This means a change of strategies not only of those countries involved in the merger (insiders) but also of those not involved (outsiders) and will affect welfare of all countries (valuations).
Typically, insiders will increase their abatement efforts but this may be matched by an expansion of emissions of outsiders. The amount of these leakage effects depends on the particular coalition structure, on the parameters of the marginal damage and cost functions and on the physical parameters of the climate system. Thus, individual insiders may lose but also aggregate welfare of insiders may decline through a merger. However for our data set, it turns out that a merger always increases aggregate welfare of insiders. That is, the superadditivity property holds. 9 Hence, our transfer scheme ensures that each coalition member receives in any coalition structure different from the singleton coalition structure a higher valuation. However, this does not imply that individual insiders are better off in a coalition structure compared to a coalition structure A formal definition is provided for instance in Bloch (1997) .
global environmental problem that this property does not hold, otherwise full cooperation would always be an equilibrium outcome.
In addition, in our global warming game it can be empirically established that outsiders always benefit from a merger, irrespective whether we assume transfers or not. That is, in our game, the positive externality property holds (see previous footnote) -a feature that illustrates the free-rider incentive in global pollution control. This has two implications. Firstly, every country is better off in any coalition structure different from the singleton coalition structure with transfers. Without transfers, this is only generally true for singletons. Secondly, we do not have to consider profitability as a separate condition in our definition of stability (see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) because it is straightforward to show that internal stability is a sufficient condition for profitability (see Finus and Rundshagen 2003a) .
Reference Simulations
In order to highlight some general features of our empirical model, we consider some benchmark simulation. Figure 1 shows annual world carbon emissions in three scenarios: business-as-usual (BAU), implying no emission reduction ( ), Nash equilibrium (NASH), corresponding to the singleton coalition structure, and social optimum, SOCIAL, correponding to the grand coalition.
Carbon Emissions and Concentration
i,t 0 i, µ = ∀ ∀ t 10 We only consider carbon emissions originating from fossil fuel use where world carbon emissions in 1990 amount to approximately 6 gigatons of carbon. BAU-emissions continuously grow, reach nearly 40 GtC by the year 2100, and more than 62 GtC in 2200.
NASH-emissions grow at a slightly slower rate. In contrast, SOCIAL-emissions are substantially lower: in 2100 they amount to roughly 24 GtC, and only 21 GtC in 2200. This is about half of NASH-emissions in 2100 and almost one third of NASH-emissions in 2200. In contrast to NASH and BAU-emissions, the SOCIAL-emission path rises only until 2150, levels off at about 26 GtC, and decreases afterwards. At the level of individual countries there are substantial differences across regions. Taking averages of abatement over time, we find in the Nash equilibrium that CHN abates about 7.70%, followed by EU with 7.24% and USA with 6.44%. The lowest abatement effort is undertaken by ROW with only 1.45%. World average abatement amounts to 3.74%. For ROW low abatement is due to strong free-rider incentives within this heterogeneous region.
11 For CHN high abatement is due to low marginal abatement costs and for EU this is due to their high climate change damage valuation. In the social optimum world average abatement is 37.14%. CHN and ROW are required to reduce their emissions substantially more than other regions (68.13% and 55.50%, respectively) due to their low marginal abatement costs.
Macroreconomic Magnitudes
Figures 3 and 4 show the time profiles of world consumption, Z, investment, I, abatement cost, YC, and damage costs, YD, for NASH-and SOCIAL-scenario where potential production, Y, is the sum of these components (see (1)). It is evident that production and consumption profiles are quite similar in both scenarios. Small differences stem from the fact that abatement costs and damage costs constitute a small portion of total production and consumption. Hence, strong differences in the emission and concentration path in both scenarios do not alter YC+YD. However, the composition of YC and YD is different in the two scenarios. In the Nash equilibrium abatement costs are very small (they do not show up in Figure 3 ) but climate change damage are high. In contrast, in the social optimum damages are relatively small but this gain requires devoting part of the production to emission abatement. As in Nordhaus and Yang (1996) , we have revised downward the climate change damage parameter of ROW in all partitions in which ROW is a singleton in order to account for the fact that this region consists of many countries.
FIGURE 3 and FIGURE 4 about here
0.52%. This is due three reasons. Firstly, as pointed out above, abatement costs and climate change damages are small compared to production or consumption. Secondly, differences between both scenarios in terms of welfare occure mainly in the far future but receive less weight due to discounting. Thirdly, abatement costs are relatively high compared to the benefits from reduced emissions, so that also in the social optimum only moderate action is required. Nevertheless, there are large differences between both scenarios in ecological terms:
emissions are 106 and concentration is 138 percent higher in the Nash equilibrium than in the social optimum (see also Table 2 and 3 in section 4). In terms of individual winners and losers, we find that CHN and, to a lesser extent, ROW would lose from full cooperation without transfers. 12 With transfers, however, profitability holds for all countries in the social optimum and as mentioned above for any other coalition structure different from the grand coalitions as well. Hence, without transfers the grand coalition can never be an equilibrium. However, profitability is only a necessary condition for stability and, as we will see from section 4, by no means sufficient to guarantee stability.
Stable Coalition Structures
In this section, we report on results of our stability analysis. In subsection 4.1, we explain the information contained in Table 2 and 3 and in subsection 4.2 we provide some rationale that helps to explain membership in stable coalitions. In subsection 4.3, we evaluate stable coalition structures.
12
A more detailed analysis of the incentive to cooperate is provided in subsection 4.2. Table 2 and 3   Table 2 and 3 list stable coalition structures in the no transfer and transfer case, respectively.
Information in
The first column lists the number of a particular coalition structure where to each coalition structure a number between 1 and 203 is attached. Coalition structure no. 1 represents the singleton coalition structure, corresponding to the "conventional" Nash equilibrium, whereas coalition structure no. 203 is the grand coalition, corresponding to the "conventional" social optimum. Moreover, coalition structure no. 196 represents the "old Kyoto coalition" before the US decided to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and coalition structure no. 87 corresponds to the "new Kyoto coalition" after the US-withdrawal. Apart from stable coalition structures, these coalition structures are listed because they represent interesting benchmarks. 
TABLE 2 and 3 about here
Column 6 gives total discounted welfare over all regions and the entire . We take this feature to sort coalition structures in descending order. Column 8 gives concentration at the end of the period and column 10 indicates global cumulative emissions over the entire period. In order to evaluate coalition structures, we compute a "degree of externality index" (DEX). This index measures the differences between the outcome in some coalition structure c and the social optimum (grand coalition) in relation to the social optimum, expressed as percentage. By definition, in the social optimum the degree of externality is 0. Columns 7, 9
and 11 display this index for welfare, concentration and emissions, respectively. All numbers have been rounded to "sensible" digits.
Membership in Stable Coalition Structures
From a first glance at Tables 2 and 3 , it seems that intuition is not confirmed: in many coalitions there are members of which one would expect that they should show little interest in forming a coalition and/or not with those regions listed in Table 2 and 3. For instance, in the context of no transfers, it may be suspected that the "rest of the world" (ROW) should show little interest in participating in an agreement and that USA and ROW will hardly be in one coalition because of different interests. However, a closer inspection of the underlying fundamentals resolves this puzzle.
Firstly, climate change damage parameters in our model are modified estimates of RICE that may not be in line with the presumed perception of regions´ damages. For instance, it has been argued that developing countries will pay little attention to environmental damages due to strong preferences for economic growth. This would suggest for instance that the damage costs of ROW should be very low, though in our model they are relatively high, despite we assume higher discount rates for ROW and CHN than for the rest of the countries (see Appendix).
Secondly, the conjecture that countries forming a coalition with other countries are the "good guys" and countries remaining singletons are the "bad guys" is premature. This conjecture presumes that coalition members will substantially reduce their emissions compared to the non-cooperative benchmark and compared to outsiders. However, this may not always be the case. For instance, suppose two regions that both have high marginal abatement costs and low marginal damages costs form a coalition. Then joint welfare maximization calls only for a moderate emission reduction. Hence, internal stability will not be much of a problem for these regions. In contrast, a singleton with low marginal abatement costs and high marginal damage costs may already reduce emissions substantially by itself.
Thirdly, not only low abatement but also a homogenous incentive structure among coalition members is important for internal stability. In the case of no transfer, clearly, homogenous incentives follow from similar marginal abatement and damage costs patterns. However, also a region of type 1 (e.g., ROW) with relatively low marginal abatement costs and high marginal damages and a region of type 2 (e.g., JPN) where this is reversed have a similar incentive structure. Type 1 contributes much to joint abatement but also benefits much whereas for type 2 this is reversed. Hence, contributions and gains are equally distributed. In such a coalition also a region of type 3 (e.g., USA and FSU) with moderate marginal abatement costs and marginal damages may fit in. This explains why USA, JPN, FSU and ROW are frequent members of stable coalition structures as listed in Table 2 .
In contrast, a region of type 4 (e.g., EU) with relatively high marginal abatement and damage costs finds it difficult to find partners for cooperation (though it has much interest in cooperation). It contributes relatively little to joint abatement but benefits more than proportionally.
Moreover, it causes that a high abatement target is implemented within the coalition due to its high marginal damages. This explains why EU is a member of a coalition in only two coalition structures listed in Table 2 .
Finally, a region of type 5 (e.g., CHN) with low marginal abatement and marginal damage costs would find many cooperating partners but has no incentive itself to join a coalition as long as there is no compensation. This explains why CHN is no coalition member of any stable coalition structure listed in Table 2 . This is different in the case of transfers (see Table 3 ). Now interests are more balanced. CHN is compensated for her high contribution and receives a fair share of the gains from cooperation. For other regions, cooperation with CHN but also with ROW is attractive since this lowers abatement costs of joint cooperation.
Fourthly, not only the lack of internal stability but also of external or intracoalitional stability explains membership. For instance, under open membership and to some extent under exclusive membership with majority voting coalitions including CHN are not stable because outsiders would have an incentive to join.
Evaluating Stable Coalition Structures
General comments
From Tables 2 and 3 , it is evident that the singleton coalition structure (no. 1) is stable in the single but not in the multiple coalition game. In the single coalition game this is an "artificial result" of the construction of the game but does not affect the subsequent interpretations. If each player announces i 0 σ = , then no single player can change his/her membership by a single deviation. In other words, the singleton coalition structure is stable by definition. 13 In the multiple coalition game, this is different. Suppose each player announces a different address.
Then coalition structure no. 1 is only stable if either no player has an incentive to join another singleton by announcing the same address (intracoalitional stability 1) or if there is such an incentive and the second player has no interest in such a merger (intracoalitional stability 2).
However, since there are four coalition structures of the form ({i,j},{k},{l},{m},{n}) in the no transfer case (no. 2, 4, 5 and 6) and five in the transfer case (no. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) that are internally stable, it is evident that there are enough regions that have an interest in a merger with another region and hence no. 1 cannot be intracoalitional stable.
The grand coalition is not stable regardless how stability is defined. In the no transfer case this follows immediately from the fact that CHN and ROW are worse off than in the singleton coalition structure (see Table 1 ). However, profitability is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for internal stability. An important reason for instability is high abatement contributions of all participants as this is the case in the social optimum. Hence, it is particular attractive for a member to leave the grand coalition because this reduces abatement costs substan-
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Of course, the advantage of this construction is that existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed which may not be the case in the multiple coalition game. For discussion of this and related issues see Finus/Rundshagen (2003c) .
tially but increases damages only moderately. A similar argument explains why also coalitions of five or four regions are not stable: the incentive to leave a coalition increases with the number of coalition members. Therefore, it also not surprising that we find in line with other studies (e.g., Barrett 1998 , Bosello et al. 2001 , Eyckmans 2001 ) that neither the "old" nor the "new" Kyoto coalition is stable. Of course, in our setting abatement targets follow from the assumption of the valuation function and may therefore differ from those agreed in Kyoto and subsequent COP-meetings. Also welfare implications may be different because we do not model permit trading. Nevertheless, our results help to explain the difficulties in Kyoto and subsequent meetings to reach a final agreement and to gather enough ratification so that the protocol enters into force.
Interestingly, our results also suggest that both Kyoto coalitions (new and old) would not much narrow the gap between social optimum and Nash equilibrium and that there are many other coalition structures that would perform far better. Given the caveats mentioned above, this indicates that a subgroup of the Kyoto coalition could improve upon the outcome of the negotiations by looking for different members. Of course, this may require some transfer to provide sufficient incentives for others to join.
Our results also confirm two general conclusions from the theoretical literature assuming symmetric countries that have been mentioned in the introduction. 1) The number of participants is not necessarily a good indicator for the success of an IEA. For instance, the old Kyoto coalition (coalition structure no. 196) counts four members, is not stable, and is inferior in welfare and ecological terms to many other stable coalition structures with and without transfers. Also coalition structure no. 4 with only one coalition of two members is superior to coalition structure no. 20 with one coalition of three members and no. 153 with two coalitions of two members that are all stable in the multiple coalition game under exclusive membership, unanimity voting and no transfers (see Table 2 ). 2) Whenever the degree of externality is low, only small coalitions are stable but they achieve much and if the degree is high, the opposite holds. In our context, this degree is small in welfare terms (0.52 percent; though admittedly it is larger in ecological terms) since abatement costs are relatively high compared to the benefits from reduced damages. In our setting, the largest single coalition comprises three members and the largest coalition in a coalition structure with multiple coalitions comprises two members. Nevertheless, those small coalitions close the gap between social optimum and Nash equilibrium substantially. For instance, in the case of no transfer coalition structure no. 26 (that is stable under EM-UV; see Table 2 ) reduces the gap by more than a half in welfare and ecological terms and in the case of transfers coalition structure no. 31 (that is stable under EM-MV and EM-UV in the multiple coalition game; see Table 3 ) closes this gap even more. As Barrett (1994) pointed out, this relation may be reversed for CFCs, predicting large coalitions but less success for solving the problem of the depletion of the ozone layer effectively.
Open versus exclusive membership
In the no transfer case (Table 2) , it is evident that no non-trivial coalition structure is stable under open membership, a few are stable under exclusive membership and majority voting and relatively many under exclusive membership and unanimity voting. This applies to the single and multiple coalition game. More important, those additional equilibrium coalition structures imply higher welfare and lower emissions and concentrations. In the case of transfers, the difference is less pronounced. In the single coalition game, the set of equilibrium coalitions for all membership rules is the same. However, in the multiple coalition game, a similar general conclusion as mentioned for no transfers can be drawn.
From a theoretical point of view, the results are interesting since they suggest that the assumption of open membership is crucial for the negative conclusions derived in the literature. From an applied point of view, the results are interesting in two respects. Firstly, it suggests that it may be worthwhile to think whether to adopt an exclusive membership rule, which is typical for club good agreements, also for public good agreements like those on climate change in the future. Majority voting is inferior to unanimity voting but still improves on the open membership rule. Secondly, voting under exclusive membership requires some degree of consensus among coalition partners. Thus, though it is usually argued that the need for consensus within international organization and governments has a negative impact on efficiency and effectiveness, in the present context consensus is conducive to cooperation, helping to stabilize an IEA.
Single versus Multiple Coalitions
Firstly, we observe that if coalition formation is not restricted to a single coalition multiple coalitions emerge in equilibrium. Of course, considering the membership in these coalition structures suggest that it is more appropriate to talk about multiple instead of regional agreements. It is not the geographical distance that decides on membership but the "distance in the incentive pattern". Secondly, we observe that in the case of transfers the four firstly ranked coalition structures in terms of global welfare are coalition structures with multiple coalitions.
Thirdly, our previous conjecture of section 2 is confirmed that regions that have no incentive to join a coalition will form their own coalition if this is possible and this implies a Pareto- From a theoretical point of view the results are interesting in two respects. Firstly, they demonstrate that not only for symmetric players but also for heterogeneous players we can expect that multiple coalitions form in equilibrium. Secondly, they illustrate that the option to form multiple coalitions will enhance the prospectives for cooperation -a conjecture that could not be substantiated by theory so far. From an applied point of view our results support the efforts in recent IEAs not to treat all members and potential members equally. In fact, it may be worthwhile to draft different protocols that suite different groups of countries. In this sense, it may be questioned whether it was a clever strategy by the USA before they dropped out of the Kyoto Protocol to link their ratification to the acceptance of emission ceilings by developing countries like CHN and India. It may well be the case that more could have been achieved if separate protocols were designed for industrialized countries, developing countries and countries in transition. Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the first four stable coalition structures in the multiple coalition game under exclusive membership in the case of transfers (no. 31 to 30) are superior to the coalition structure with the highest welfare in the case of no transfers (no. 26). Thus, the conjecture is confirmed that transfers are an important tool to increase participation and the success of stable agreements. Nevertheless, also transfers cannot totally overcome free-rider incentives and hence stable coalition structures comprise only small coalitions and welfare is below, as well as concentration and emissions are above globally optimal levels.
No transfers versus transfers
The results are in line with almost all theoretical and empirical findings of coalition models that show that transfers lead to superior outcomes (see the literature discussed and cited in Protocol, to establish multilateral funds that compensate developing countries for cooperation.
Summary and Conclusions
We modeled coalition formation in international climate change control as a two stage game: For future research, we would like to mention three (of certainly many possible) extensions.
Firstly, other transfer schemes than the Chander/Tulkens´ transfer rule that we considered could be analyzed. The purpose of this exercise would be to find an "optimal transfer scheme" that allows -in the face of heterogeneous interests -for stable coalition structures generating high global welfare. Secondly, and closely related to the first point, the effect of different permit trading schemes on coalition formation could be analyzed. This may include the currently discussed schemes in the Kyoto Protocol but also alternative forms as discussed for instance in Böhringer (2002) , Buchner and Carraro (2003) , Kverndokk (1995) and Rose et al. (1998) . Thirdly, stability may not only be defined in terms of single deviations but also in terms of multiple deviations. Whereas this is a straightforward exercise in theory (e.g., Finus
and Rundshagen 2003c), we recognize that this is an ambitious task in an empirical context of 203 different coalition structures. 
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